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## Zhu Fadong: Why Art Is Powerless to Make Social Change



Zhu Fadong, *Identity Cards*, 1998–2015, documentation of identity cards. Courtesy of the artist.

*Art appears rather powerless against realities.*<sup>1</sup>

—Zhu Fadong

This text explores problems of inequality and rural-urban class disparity generated by the *hukou* system, which was introduced in mainland China in the 1950s with the aim of preventing migration from rural to urban areas. The ideas presented here are based on an interview with contemporary Chinese artist Zhu Fadong about his project *Identity Cards* (1998–2015). In the name of progress and modernization in the 1990s, the state introduced a massive program of reconstruction of cities, as well as a pedagogical program—the *wenming* reform—focused on Westernization as a means of entry into the global market. To fulfil the goal of modernization, a disciplinary power of the state—biopower—emerged. The following questions will be addressed: What was the modernization of Chinese cities like? How was a new globalized Chinese citizen constructed? How did biopower affect the modernization process? And how is Zhu Fadong’s art project *Identity Cards* positioned within these issues?



Zhu Fadong's authentic Identity Card, front and back. Courtesy of the artist.

Zhu Fadong's *Identity Cards* was inspired by the fact that every adult in mainland China must hold an identity card (ID card), which reveals important household information. The artist produced his own identity cards to raise awareness about the fact that government-issued identity cards oblige citizens to remain in the area where they were born. Zhu Fadong has been producing these *Identity Cards*, which look different from the official cards on which they are based, and sold them for fifty yuan.



The price of Zhu Fadong's *Identity Cards* is notable when compared to the actual price for the second generation of the ID cards introduced in 2004. The official ID card costs twenty yuan for a new card, ten yuan for a temporary one, and forty yuan if the previous card gets lost.<sup>2</sup> Some citizens who are living on minimum social security allowances are not charged the fee.<sup>3</sup> The different formal characteristics as well as the price asked by the artist for his *Identity Cards* suggest that Zhu Fadong treats

Zhu Fadong, *Identity Cards*, 1998–2015, 13 x 9 cm, Zhu Fadong's personal identity card. Courtesy of the artist.

his ID cards as art objects created to raise awareness and encourage a discourse on the issue of these cards, rather than as fake documents.

Zhu Fadong's inspiration was frustration: "Whether you are now in big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, or Guangzhou, as long as you show your ID card, you will have your registered permanent residence exposed immediately. You don't belong to this city where you live. It's nearly impossible to change this situation for ordinary people."<sup>4</sup> He adds, "My work is a response to this system of unfairness and prejudice. This is a response from me as a citizen as well as an artist. I hope the Chinese can also enjoy the freedom of migration, for it is merely a basic human right!"<sup>5</sup>

Identity issues have provided inspiration for artists worldwide—art has responded to, challenged, and contemplated artists' personal identity, including feminist identity, gender identity, postcolonial, diasporic, and even cyborg identities. Many artists have also directly incorporated and questioned ID cards in their work. For instance, the Slovenian art group NSK responded to the political and social situation in their home country (the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s) by creating their own state without a territory—*State in Time* (1992)—which involved the creation of an administrative branch that would issue NSK passports. Serbian artist

NSK, *Passports*, 1992–ongoing. Courtesy of the State of NSK.



Santiago Sierra, *Wall Enclosing a Space*, 2003, bricks and cement, Spanish Pavilion, Venice Biennale. Courtesy of Studio Santiago Sierra, Madrid.



*Deep European Visa Department*, component of *Hybrid Workspace*, 1997, documenta X, Kassel, curated by Geert Lovink. Photo: Luchezar Boyadjiev. Courtesy of Geert Lovink.



Tanja Ostojić's project *Looking for a Husband with EU Passport*, 2000–05, documented her personal struggle to gain a passport that would allow her to live in the European Union. Czech art group Ztohoven's *Citizen K*, 2009–10, involved twelve members of the group applying for, and living with, officially issued ID cards that had digitally morphed photographs. They intended to expose the control and surveillance components of national ID cards as they exist in contemporary Europe. At documenta X in Kassel, on

August 2, 1997, several media and art practitioners met for a project curated by Geert Lovink titled *Hybrid Workspace*, which included *Deep Europe Visa Department* as one of ten workshops. Every visitor who wanted to enter had to apply for a visa; the application process replicated the administrative apparatus of a real institutional application process. Similarly, in 2003, Spanish artist Santiago Sierra, in his work for the Spanish Pavilion at the Venice Biennale, *Wall Enclosing a Space* (2003), allowed entry only to Spanish passport holders. Chilean artist Alfredo Jaar's work *One Million Finnish*



Left: Alfredo Jaar, *One Million Finnish Passports*, 2014, one million replicated Finnish passports, glass, installation view at Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma, Helsinki Finland. Courtesy of the artist and Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma, Helsinki.

*Passports* (1995/2014), commented on the then strict Finnish immigration policy by printing up a million Finnish passports and displaying them behind bulletproof glass as a representation of the barriers to Finnish citizenship. In 2000, German artist Christoph Schlingensiefel held a week-long event in Vienna entitled *Bitte Liebst Österreich* in which he questioned Austrian attitudes toward immigration by putting twelve participants, introduced as asylum-seekers, in a cordoned-off shipping container complex surveilled by closed-circuit television cameras and placed next to the Vienna Opera House. Austrian audience participation was required; visitors were asked to phone in and vote out inhabitants, the two least popular of whom were ejected each day. Mexican performance artist Guillermo Gomez-Peña reflected on issues surrounding the Mexican/American border in his performance *Border Brujo* (1989). Sitting at an altar decorated with a kitsch collection of cultural fetish items, the artist illustrated the double edge of forced cultural occupation and mutual misunderstandings. Livia Ungur of Unger & Huang, originally from Romania, in her performance *Green Card*, wore her green card, which allowed her to live and work in the USA legally through the year 2011, as a necklace. Chinese artist Hung Liu also looked at cards and exclusion in her work *Resident Alien* (1988), in which she painted her self-portrait on an enlarged “green card” and changed her real name to Fortune Cookie.



Right: Unger & Huang, *Green Card*, 2011, performance at New York Philharmonic. Courtesy of the artists.

Personal identity has become another important issue explored by artists in mainland China during the vast shifts in the period of modernization. In the 1990s, two performance artists, Ma Liuming and Zhang Huan, were among those whose work in general explored the body and nudity under what

were challenging circumstances. As Sheldon H. Lu notes, “Today, no public platform for the artistic performance of the naked body in post-socialist China exists. Perceived as subversive and perverse, such exhibitions are held in private and nonofficial spaces.”<sup>67</sup> He argues that by using their own bodies, these two artists “question the modern procedures of the subjectification of the individual, and contest the laws and taboos of the socialist sovereign state.”<sup>68</sup> Here he refers to Giorgio Agamben, who states that: “It can be even said that the production of a biopolitical body is the

original activity of sovereign power.”<sup>9</sup> I would argue that, in a similar way, Zhu Fadong, in his performance *This Person Is for Sale* (1994), employed his own body by wandering in public places, using his own body as a medium of his art to challenge the new reality of modern Chinese subjects. This performance consequently led Zhu Fadong to explore identity cards in 1998.

Right: Zhu Fadong, *This Person Is For Sale*, 1994.  
Photo: Zhang Xejun. Courtesy of the artist.



### Zhu Fadong—Art of Dialogue

*I have always considered the artist a medium.*<sup>10</sup>

To position Zhu Fadong’s work within a contemporary Chinese art discourse, one can recall the words of Chinese artist Qiu Zhijie, who questions “whether art should express some kind of intrinsic ‘meaning’ (*yiyi*), or whether it should focus on constructing direct ‘effects’ (*jieguo*).”<sup>11</sup> By “effects” he means “a real situation created through a formal experiment, not an author’s inward intentions

and situation created through a formal experiment.”<sup>12</sup> Qiu Zhijie argues that instead of “conceptual art,” the term “experimental art” (*shiyan yishu*) should be applied, “where this would provoke thinking through direct encounters with art.” Thomas Berghuis sees in this idea as a parallel with Li Xianting’s essay “Art is Not Important.”<sup>13</sup> “In this essay,” Berghuis writes, “Li Xianting seeks to reposition the ’85 New Wave Movement (which stands at the basis of discourses on the post-1989 Chinese avant-garde) ‘not as a modern art movement; but, at best, as a stage of ideological consciousness.’”<sup>14</sup> This idea of art functioning as a relationship and dialogue instigator closely links Zhu Fadong’s work with a global, socially engaged phenomenon because of his direct interest in social problems and his aim to provoke public awareness and dialogue. To understand how *Identity Cards* functions aesthetically and ethically within art historical discourse, it is helpful to engage with Grant H. Kester’s Dialogical Aesthetics theory. Kester criticizes the very conservative perception of aesthetics as a form and proposes the assessment of the aesthetics of socially engaged art projects based on dialogue, where the consciousness of participants and collaborators is being transformed in some meaningful way. He believes that aesthetic experience emerges from the subject’s participation in intersubjective exchange, and is, therefore, understood as moral consciousness or new knowledge, and something that happens as an individual mental experience.<sup>15</sup>

Similarly, the aesthetics of Zhu Fadong’s *Identity Cards* project are meant to be constructed through public dialogue; the artist’s intention with this work was to provoke awareness of identity cards laws, which, as a citizen, he did not agree with. The core of this art project is not the art objects themselves—the identity cards produced by the artist could not be used to migrate from rural to urban areas, for example, as they are not

legal documents. Once again, one can make a link with Qiu Zhijie, who “concludes his critique of conceptual art by considering his own ‘care for society.’ . . . This includes making artists consider doing their work ‘in situ’ and by involving ‘cultural research’ next to ‘social investigations’ that allow them to consider social change in China.”<sup>16</sup>

### The Influence of Chinese Subculture on Performance Art

In 1998 Zhu Fadong moved to Hainan Island, where he stayed alone for more than a year; this had a profound influence not only on his personal life at that time, but also on his art practice. He stayed in Haikou City and slept in basement hotels that cost just two yuan per night. These hotel rooms consist of a row of beds against the wall of a large room, with only a narrow aisle separating them. If he returned to the hotel too late, he would find all of the beds taken. Sometimes he would return so late that the hotel would be locked, and he then had to spend the night wandering the streets, sleeping outdoors with others until daybreak on a large nearby concrete slab. Finding himself without a residence, some days he would wander the streets aimlessly, selling newspapers to make money, while also searching for other work.



Zhu Fadong, *Looking for A Missing Person*, 1993, photograph. Courtesy of the artist.

During the 1980s and 90s hooligan (*liumang*) culture emerged as a response to modernization. Many theorists discuss hooligan culture as an influential aspect of the emergence of alternative culture, including performance art. *Liumang* culture manifested itself in literature,<sup>17</sup> music, and even politics.<sup>18</sup> In 1986, John Minford used the metaphor of a spectrum to describe China’s hooligans: “Rapist, whore, black-marketeer, unemployed youth, alienated intellectual, frustrated artist or poet—the spectrum has its dark, satanic end, its long middle band of relentless grey, and, shining at the other end, a patch of visionary light. It is an embryonic alternative culture. . . .<sup>19</sup>” Tanner M. Harold

believes the non-criminal *pizi* variety of hooligans represented an alternative, non-official culture.<sup>20</sup> As a part of non-official culture, *pizi* (mostly young men) were violating social norms. Harold explains that modernization involved “the questioning of old ways of life and, ultimately, their destruction.”<sup>21</sup> He compares them with English youth subcultures: “While the dangerous, criminal *liumang* was labelled, dehumanized, and punished by the criminal justice system, the *liumang* style was appropriated and commercialized by authors, artists, and performers.”<sup>22</sup> A link to studies of subculture with performance art can be

found here, as performance art, or *xingwei yishu*, “describes the deliberate provocation of a ‘behavioural’ action (*xingwei*) or ‘conduct’ (*pinxing*) realized through the practice and conditioning of art (*yishu*).”<sup>23</sup> This 1990s alternative hooligan culture that was characterized by breaking up societal taboos was an influential time for Zhu Fadong. There were many people who, similarly, like Zhu Fadong, left their homes to move to Hainan Island without telling anyone. Hence, there were notices for missing persons everywhere in the streets. It was the first thing Zhu Fadong noticed when he arrived to the island. These notices appeared on telegraph poles or inside hotels, residential buildings, and office buildings, which resulted in his work *Looking for a Missing Person* (1993). He explains:

These notices were everywhere. In fact, I myself came to Hainan Island without notifying others and could be counted as a person to be looked for. . . . Suddenly, I thought that I should do something. It was obvious that this time no flat drawing or sculpture could express my feelings. I thought of posting notices for missing persons or little ads. At that time, I didn’t mind whether this piece of work was a drawing, a sculpture or anything else. It was enough that it could express my feelings. Then I began to consider the contents of notices for missing persons. I suddenly felt that those being looked for at Hainan Island or in the rest of the world by their relatives and friends were, in fact, not lost to themselves. They were only looking for themselves everywhere in a conscious or subconscious way, just as what I was doing. Therefore, I decided to look for myself. What I didn’t expect was that I could not stop this process of seeking.<sup>24</sup>

### **The Biopolitics of Chinese Modern Life**

The social order strategies introduced by the government in the modernization of Beijing during the 1990s and the new pedagogical program presented by the Chinese state was shaped around the discourse on civilization—the previously mentioned *wenming*. The significance of the *wenming* concept can be understood, as Ann Anagnost proposes, by the terms “modernity,” “Westernization,” or “civilization.” Its aim was to “refashion the Chinese masses into a modern citizenry.”<sup>25</sup>

I would like to draw a parallel here to Judith Butler’s argument that the term “civilization” works against the conception of the human, as there is no single defining feature of the human. Butler’s analysis can help us to understand what effects modernization had in China on some groups of citizens. She claims that: “The term and the practice of ‘civilization’ work to produce the human differentially by offering a culturally limited norm for what the human is supposed to be.” Based on this differentiation, then one is to be decided to be treated humanely or not.<sup>26</sup>

One of such groups affected by *wenming* reform was made up of the illegal residents who had in preceding years travelled to the capital in the hope of finding work. Ann Anagnost wrote that “The *wenming* discourse and the diverse campaigns it engendered also played a part in constructing the

Chinese peasant as the inappropriate ‘other’ of modernity, unfit for the project of modernization, and from whom urban elites wish to distinguish themselves.”<sup>27</sup>

Hence, we can argue that the state employed disciplinary procedures to create efficient, well behaved, and productive individuals, which recalls Michel Foucault’s biopolitics—regulatory controls and interventions focused on the species body imbued with the mechanics of life.<sup>28</sup> Biopower, the way in which biopolitics is put to work in society, emerged as a part of capitalist development and resulted in the state gaining control over its citizens within economic processes. Hence, in China, various techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations were introduced. These also led to segregation and social hierarchization of the population, which affected, for example, the movement of people, as Zhu Fadong’s work demonstrates. The objectives of the “civilization” or “Westernization” program, were in ensuring the “social control and ideological domination through production of docile political subjects.”<sup>29</sup>

One of the examples where the subjugation of bodies was performed was in restricting the right of movement, as Zhu Fadong explains:

To me, [the] ID card means that you have no choice. It’s a fact that no one can choose, where to be born or [to] whom to be born. It is a passive thing. But when one becomes an adult, one should have the right to move. What influences or dominates such a choice can only be one’s personal will and adaptability to the resettled area, not other factors such as ID, registered permanent residence, etc. That is, the citizens in China should have the most fundamental human right endowed by the United Nations Human Rights Conventions—everyone should enjoy the freedom to migrate.<sup>30</sup>

Why was the *hukou* system introduced and how does it influence the everyday lives of people in China? During the Mao era, class hierarchy was recreated and imposed by the state in socialist economy and ideology. To maintain social stability, internal passports called *hukou* booklets listed one’s household name and type, issuing agency and date, handling person’s signature, seal, registration date, and data on each family member: name, name of householder or relationship to householder, former name, gender, birth location, ethnic group, origin location, birth date, other address in the city, identity card number, height, blood type, educational level, marital status, employment location, position, when and from where moved into the city, and when and from where moved to the address. Historically, during the Mao era, it was almost impossible for rural people to migrate into urban areas; this changed after 1984, when the state encouraged migration into urban areas with the aim of supplying labour for the growing demand of (trans)national capital. Paradoxically, it also strengthened other discriminative policies against rural migrants achieved through the *hukou* system. For instance, access to state-sponsored medical care and pensions is not given to rural migrants in cities; similarly, they have experienced unfair treatment by the police.



This control of migration in China led Peter Alexander and Anita Chan to explore the existence of an apartheid pass system in China and to compare it with South Africa's apartheid. They propose that: "the essence of both systems lies in the use of passes to control the influx of rural migrants into urban areas, thereby buttressing cheap labour economies."<sup>31</sup> However, in 2013 Jason Young argued that: "Where once it blocked migration outright, *hukou* can no longer prevent Chinese mobility, but it does still control and limit access to social services delivered at the local government level. Local *hukou* rights grant the holder eligibility to education, healthcare, and some forms of employment in urban China, and, to land contracts and housing in rural China."<sup>32</sup>

NSK, *Become a Citizen*, poster.  
Courtesy of the State of NSK.



Major currents in identity discourse are concerned not just with people holding a particular identity, but also with those who are denied that right. There are individuals who have an absence of identity that is the result of "the effacement or denial of individuality, of 'face'—that object of ethical duty or moral care."<sup>33</sup> This is aligned with Giorgio Agamben's theory of *homo sacer*, someone excluded, outside the law.<sup>34</sup> This problem has become even more apparent during the current migration crisis, when over millions of

people found themselves crossing borders without appropriate papers. This is exemplified in the previously mentioned 1992 *State in Time* project by the Slovenian group NSK, which was meant as a conceptual challenge to the idea of the nationalism and state border restrictions. However, paradoxically, the group in their over-identification with the nation-state formation they had aimed to critique ended up creating an administrative branch of NSK *State in Time* and the issuing of passports resembling the official state apparatus. By 2012, there had been a notable demand for the NSK passports from outside of Europe. These applicants, particularly from Nigeria, originally mistakenly saw NSK passports as a way into the European Union. Regardless of the motivation of the applications from Nigeria, using NSK passports for crossing borders might be considered a criminal act, which led NSK to put up the following statement on their website: "The NSK State is not an officially recognized country internationally, and the NSK State passport is not a legally valid document. Holding an NSK Passport does not grant citizenship to the Republic of Slovenia or of any other country of the world. You cannot legally cross any international border using an NSK passport!"<sup>35</sup> However, this attempted use of NSK passports to cross borders is not entirely new. Inke Arns claims that a group of Bosnians managed to cross international borders in the late 1990s with NSK passports.<sup>36</sup> This was at a time when Bosnia was not internationally recognized, and therefore its citizens had no papers to allow them to travel abroad. NSK's artistic

challenge to state structures, therefore, took on a new life by subverting ID Cards in a new way.

The NSK project demonstrates one's dependence on the identity given by the state. Except in exceptional circumstances where the nation state is absent or in crisis, one cannot decide or choose to live without national identity because the system simply does not allow it. Similarly, Chinese migrant workers from rural areas find themselves without appropriate documents and have been illegally migrating with hope for a better life in the city. Hence, like refugees, they are basically excluded from the territory they inhabit, even within their own home country.

Since 1998, hundreds of people have applied for the *Identity Cards* made by Zhu Fadong, including those who are involved in the art world such as artists, collectors, gallerists, critics, and curators, as well as those who encountered his art by accident.

These people are from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and all around the world. From the very beginning, Zhu Fadong has documented his project, and he told me, “I have kept all the original documents related to the ‘identity card’, including the proposal, application forms, dates of receiving the applications and making the cards.”<sup>37</sup> In 2015, in the interview for this article, Zhu Fadong explained how his project came to its end:

Zhu Fadong, *Identity Cards*, 1998–2015, identity card application forms. Courtesy of the artist

It is not because the situation now has changed or been improved. On the contrary. Art appears rather powerless against the realities. It is also hard for my artistic concept to be known by more audiences. Art is limited to a circle or a small range, just like the Internet in China. Is there an Internet in China? The answer is yes. But needless to say, everyone knows the real situation. But, of course, it's better to have access to than be completely blocked from the Internet.<sup>38</sup>

He concluded that:

I have clearly realized that under the current system, *Identity Cards* can be only a small-range work, and, moreover, people seem to be less concerned about the messages my work reveals. They have become accustomed to it. A very serious issue for me has become a game to many people. When I realized that my work was starting to deviate from (or had already deviated from) my original purpose, it was time to end it.<sup>39</sup>

Wu Hung explained that in the 2000s, Chinese art “changed and installation and other unorthodox forms lost their initial novelty and distinct political implications.”<sup>40</sup> Maybe this is also an important aspect of the conclusion of Zhu Fadong’s *Identity Cards* project. It became commercialized and depoliticized, and its political message was lost. Art dealers and curators are interested in owning his *Identity Cards*, but why Zhu Fadong was making the cards is not conveyed. Could it perhaps be sadly concluded that this was another art project with “good intentions,”<sup>41</sup> as Azimi Negar puts it, but unsuccessful in terms of social change? In an article on socially engaged art, she asks: “Are artists really able to levitate above the ugly stuff of politics and effect change?”<sup>42</sup> Carol Yinghua Lu claims: “In China, the art community’s silence when it comes to political issues is one of the most distinctive features of artistic production and discourse today.”<sup>43</sup> She argues that the political silence in Chinese art is the result of the government’s growing support of the domestic art market and its promotion of Chinese art exhibitions abroad. She concludes that “the Chinese art community has no vision for the future, but is only concerned with its own self-interest and self-preservation. As a result, the contemporary art world in China has not broken free from the government’s narrow political vision, and has instead fallen prey to self-isolation and arrogance.”<sup>44</sup> To again use Zhu Fadong’s own words: “Art appears rather powerless against realities.”<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, the experimental nature and social engagement of Zhu Fadong’s work in political and social issues are undoubtedly important to consider. Despite the biopolitics that have arisen since the modernization period, there is also a counter power wielded by a youthful generation of artists, such as Zhu Fadong, who have questioned the state regulatory system. The dialogical aspect of *Identity Cards* is successful, and the way it puts the system of surveillance into question is important. It thus positions itself within contemporary socially and politically engaged art discourse.

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#### Notes

1. Zhu Fadong, e-mail conversation with the author, May 2015.
2. Cheryl L. Brown, “China’s Second-generation Identity Card: Merging Culture, Industry and Technology,” in J. Colin Bennett and David Lyon, *Playing the Identity Card: Surveillance, Security and Identification in Global Perspective* (New York and London: Routledge, 2009), 59.
3. Brown, “China’s Second-generation National Identity Card: Merging Culture, Industry and Technology,” 58.
4. Zhu Fadong, e-mail conversation with the author, May 2015.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Sheldon H. Lu, *Chinese Modernity and Global Biopolitics: Studies in Literature and Visual Culture* (University of Hawai’i Press, 2007), 71.
7. *Ibid.*, 71.
8. *Ibid.*, 72.

9. Giorgio Agamben, in Lu, *Chinese Modernity and Global Biopolitics*, 72.
10. Zhu Fadong, e-mail conversation with the author, May 2015.
11. Quoted in Thomas L. Berghuis, "Experimental Art, Performance and 'Publicness': Repositioning the Critical Mass of Contemporary Chinese Art," *Journal of Visual Art Practice* 11, nos. 2 and 3 (2012), 146.
12. *Ibid.*, 147.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. Grant H. Kester, *The One and The Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context*. (Duke University Press: Durham and London, 2011); Grant H. Kester, *Conversation Pieces: Community and Communication in Modern Art* (Stanford: University of California Press, 2004).
16. *Ibid.*
17. Analyzing the literary works of Wang Shuo, Geremie Barmé describes how "Increasing numbers of *liumang*-type characters have appeared in Chinese literature since the late 1970s"; see Geremie Barmé, "Wang Shuo and Liumang ('Hooligan') Culture," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* no. 28 (July 1992), 23–64, 40.
18. "In early 1989, the *Economic Weekly*, a Beijing paper run by Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming and others, published an article which commented on the *liumang* aspect of politics"; *ibid.*, 30.
19. John Minford, "Picking up the Pieces," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 8, 1985, quoted in Geremie Barmé, "Wang Shuo," 28–9, quoted in Harold M. Tanner, "The Offense of Hooliganism and The Moral Dimension of China's Pursuit of Modernity, 1979–1996," *Twentieth-Century China* 26, no. 1 (November 2000), 1–40, 25.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Tanner, "The Offense of Hooliganism and The Moral Dimension of China's Pursuit of Modernity, 1979–1996," 1–40, 25.
22. *Ibid.*, 1–40, 28.
23. Berghuis, "Experimental Art, Performance and 'Publicness': Repositioning the Critical Mass of Contemporary Chinese Art," *Journal of Visual Art Practice* 11, nos. 2, 3 (2012), 138.
24. Zhu Fadong, e-mail conversation with the author, May 2015.
25. Ann Anagost, *National Past-times: Narratives, Representations and Power in Modern China*. (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 75–80, cited in Anee-Marie Broudehoux, *The Making and Selling of Post-Mao Beijing* (Routledge: New York, 1997), 176–77.
26. Judith Butler, "Indefinite Detention," in *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London and New York: Verso: London. New York, 2004), 91.
27. Anagost, *National Past-times*, quoted in Broudehoux, *The Making and Selling of Post-Mao Beijing*, 178.
28. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, quoted in Paul Rainbow, ed., *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought* (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 262.
29. Broudehoux, *The Making and Selling of Post-Mao Beijing*, 176.
30. Zhu Fadong, e-mail conversation with the author, May 2015.
31. Peter Alexander and Anita Chan, "Does China Have an Apartheid Pass System?," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no. 4 (July 2004), 609.
32. Jason Young, *China's Hukou System: Markets, Migrants and Institutional Change* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1.
33. Zygmunt Bauman, *Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi*. (Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press, 2004), 39.
34. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1998), 66.
35. NSK website, Passport "Important Message," [https://passport.nsk.si/en/important\\_message/](https://passport.nsk.si/en/important_message/).
36. Inke Arns, "The Nigerian Connection: On NSK Passports as Escape and Entry Vehicles," *e-flux journal* 34, <http://www.e-flux.com/journal/the-nigerian-connection-on-nsk-passports-as-escape-and-entry-vehicles/>.
37. The whole project was exhibited several times; some cards and application forms were auctioned online through zhaoonline.com. Zhu Fadong, e-mail conversation with the author, May 2015.
38. Zhu Fadong, e-mail conversation with the author, May 2015. The "real situation" refers to the fact that the Internet is censored in China.
39. Zhu Fadong, e-mail conversation with the author, May 2015.
40. Wu Hung, *Contemporary Chinese Art: A History (1970s–2000s)* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2014), 364.
41. Azimi Negar, "Good Intentions," *Frieze* 13 (March 1, 2011), <http://www.frieze.com/article/good-intentions/>.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Carol Yinghua Lu, "From the Anxiety of Participation to the Process of De-Internationalization," *e-flux journal* 70 (February 2016), <http://www.e-flux.com/journal/from-the-anxiety-of-participation-to-the-process-of-de-internationalization/>.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Zhu Fadong, e-mail conversation with the author, May 2015.